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The Radicalism of Tradition: Community Strength 
or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?1 
Craig Jackson Calhoun 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
An equation has often been made, especially but not exclusively by 
Marxists, between radicalism and the rational understanding of objec- 
tive interests. I argue that, on the contrary, commitments to tradi- 
tional cultural values and immediate communal relations are crucial 
to many radical movements, (a) because these commitments provide 
populations with the extent of internal social organization necessary 
to concerted, radical collective action, and (b) because the largely 
defensive goals of these movements must be radically incompatible 
with the introduction of modern capitalist-dominated social forma- 
tions. Reformism is the characteristic stance of the modern working 
class, for both social and cultural reasons. 
That revolutions are risky undertakings poses a problem for theorists of 
popular insurrections. Why, it has often been asked, would reasonable 
people place their lives and even their loved ones in jeopardy in pursuit 
of a highly uncertain goal? Neither the success of uprisings nor the 
desirability of postrevolutionary regimes has appeared likely enough to 
outweigh the probability of privation and physical harm. A conservative 
view, as old as Plato but more recently argued by LeBon (1909), Smelser 
(1962), and others, concludes simply that revolutionaries must not be 
very reasonable people. Revolutionaries and their defenders have, of course, 
disagreed. Most famous among them, Marx offered an important argument 
for the rationality of revolution. This argument combined a notion of 
necessary historical progress with the assertion that revolution would be 
in the rational interest of the class of workers created by industrial capital- 
ism. It turned in part on the expectation that progressive immiseration of 
the proletariat would eliminate other possibilities for self-improvement and 
1 Early versions of this paper, or closely related work, were presented to the Social 
Science History Association (1979), the Southern Sociological Society (1981), the 
American Sociological Association (1981), and the Comparative History Research 
Group of the University of California, Santa Cruz (1981). I am grateful for com- 
ments from members of those audiences, including especially Robert Antonio, Rick 
Gordon, Mark Traugott, David Westby, and David Zaret. Rod Aya, Terence Evens, 
and Michael Kennedy also read an earlier draft and made very helpful suggestions; 
so did the anonymous reviewers for the AJS. Requests for reprints should be sent to 
Craig Jackson Calhoun, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514. 
? 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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Radicalism of Tradition 
leave the workers of the world with "nothing to lose but their chains." 
Conservatives have sometimes been sympathetic, suggesting that despera- 
tion might make revolt understandable if not quite reasonable. Long 
arguments have pursued the question whether the position of workers de- 
teriorated during the industrial revolution (on England, cf. Taylor 1975; 
Inglis 1971; Seldon 1974; Thompson [1963] 1968; among many). A more 
recent line of historical research has shown that, whether or not overall 
standards of living improved, the people in the forefront of European 
revolutionary mobilizations, while often workers, were seldom either the 
most miserable or the members of the modern proletariat (Price 1972; 
Tilly and Lees 1975; Moss 1976; Moore 1978; Traugott 1980; Calhoun 
1982). The most radical workers were usually artisans, sometimes peasants, 
and almost always those with at least some prosperity and often many 
privileges to defend. Their identities and aspirations were largely tradi- 
tional; they drew much of the social strength of their mobilizations from 
communal bonds, a good deal less from membership in the new "working 
class." 
Marx himself recognized the ambiguity of the ideological orientation of 
19th-century revolutionaries; he correctly saw early radicals to be ambiv- 
alent about visions of a better past to which they wished to return and 
visions of an emancipatory future which they wished to create. But Marx 
wrongly took the popular appeals to tradition to be mere epiphenomena 
which would have to be swept away before the truly great historical ac- 
complishments of revolutions could occur. As he wrote of the 1848 revolu- 
tion in France ([1852] 1973, p. 146): 
Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under 
circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and in- 
herited circumstances with which they are directly confronted. The tra- 
dition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of 
the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in the revolutionary 
transformation of themselves and their material surroundings, in the cre- 
ation of something which does not yet exist, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help 
them; they borrow their names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the 
new world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed lan- 
guage. 
Marx's insights in this passage are profound, and yet, like many heirs of 
the Enlightenment, he cannot accept the intrusion of seemingly irrelevant 
tradition into the rationality of the future. He does not grasp the changing 
significance of tradition as it enters into different practices in different 
historical contexts. Unlike the revolutionary workers recently analyzed by 
Sewell (1980), Marx does not recognize any valid continuity between the 
corporatism of the past and the socialist future. For him the fullness of 
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revolution can be only radical novelty: completely new thoughts and acts 
in dialectical opposition to old. "In the same way, the beginner who has 
learned a new language always retranslates it into his mother tongue: 
he can only be said to have appropriated the spirit of the new language 
and to be able to express himself in it freely when he can manipulate it 
without reference to the old, and when he forgets his original language 
while using the new one" ([1852] 1973, p. 147). 
Generations of analysts of revolutions and radical mobilizations have 
followed Marx's lead. Like him, they have inherited from the Enlighten- 
ment a sense of inherent opposition between rationality and tradition. I 
think this is a false opposition. It is linked to the overly simple equation 
of tradition and community with order, in contrast to the disorder of 
revolution. The political right and left have engaged in a common mis- 
understanding, for both have failed to recognize the paradoxical con- 
servatism in revolution, the radicalism of tradition. 
In the present paper T propose to examine this paradox and to argue 
that "reactionary radicals" have been at the center of most modern revolu- 
tions and many other radical mobilizations in which revolutionary out- 
comes were precluded. I shall argue that traditional communities provide 
the social foundations for widespread popular mobilizations and that tradi- 
tional values provide their radicalism. But tradition, I shall suggest, has 
been misunderstood as Bagehot's "hard cake of culture" or as mere con- 
tinuity with the past. The foremost contemporary analyst of tradition 
sees it as anything "handed down from the past" (Shils 1981, esp. pp. 
12-21). Shils follows Weber in an analysis of the variable importance of 
tradition in social action, emphasizing that we must go beyond Weber's 
opposition of traditionalism and rationalism ([1922] 1968, pp. 24-26) to 
see the importance of tradition in rationalism itself and in all societies 
(Shils 1981, p. 9). I shall ask that we go still further beyond the En- 
lightenment's historicist opposition of tradition to modernity and see tradi- 
tion as grounded less in the historical past than in everyday social practice. 
This fully sociological concept of tradition I see as inextricably linked 
to communal social relations. In the following pages, then, I shall comment 
briefly on Marx's theory of proletarian collective action and identify the 
reactionary radicals, focusing on early 19th-century France and England. 
I shall then develop my concepts of tradition and community and show 
how "conservative" attachments to tradition and community may be crucial 
bases for quite rational participation in the most radical of mobilizations, 
sometimes culminating in revolutions. Last, I shall offer a few suggestions 
as to why the modern working class has not shown the propensity for 
radicalism that artisans showed during the period of European industrial- 
ization and why reformism rather than revolution is its "natural" form 
of action. 
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MARX 
Marx argued a case in the mid-19th century for the imminence of social 
revolutions in which the new, factory-based proletariat which was growing 
up within industrial capitalism would be the protagonist. Past revolutions, 
he suggested, had been primarily the products of the bourgeoisie struggling 
to free itself from the fetters of feudal restraints on capital accumulation. 
Such revolutions had mobilized popular support, but only as an adjunct 
to their bourgeois thrust. The lower classes had grown stronger and more 
able to recognize that they must act independently of the bourgeoisie at 
the same time that the socioeconomic structure had shifted to make 
exploitation by the bourgeoisie rather than oppression by feudal lords 
their major enemy. This was not just a process of learning, then, but a 
transformation of the class structure. The new relations of production 
which created the modern proletariat gave it a radicalism and a potential 
for social revolution which Marx thought peasants, artisans, and other 
earlier groups of workers lacked. On the one hand, the proletariat would 
be radical because of the extreme misery to which it was reduced and 
the absolute polarization of classes in bourgeois society. On the other 
hand, the proletariat would be capable of sustained revolutionary mobiliza- 
tion because it was unified with an unprecedented social solidarity. 
The thrust of Marx's argument is focused on the rational reasons the 
members of the proletariat have for uniting in revolutionary collective 
action. He moves rather casually from the identification of "objective 
interests" to collective action in pursuit of those interests. Such a move 
is problematic. First, it is only an extremely positivistic theory of knowl- 
edge which allows Marx to presume rational action on the basis of 
objective interests.2 Thus, "It is not a question of what this or that 
proletarian, or even the whole proletariat at the moment regards as its 
aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance 
with this being, it will historically be compelled to do" ([1845] 1975, 
p. 37). Marx's attention is focused completely on the rational link be- 
tween objective circumstances and determined actions; the particularities 
2 See, among many instances, Marx's appropriation of Hegel's assertion of the iden- 
tity of the rational and the actual (Marx [1927] 1975, p. 63; Hegel [1821] 1967, p. 10) 
and his contrast of Feuerbachian materialism to the rest of German philosophy (Marx 
[1932] 1976, pp. 36-37). Of course, Marx's materialism stressed, not the externality of 
material phenomena, but their incorporation into human life through practical activ- 
ity, of which conscious control and awareness are always a part (Marx [1845] 1976, 
p. 4). Similarly, Marx rejects the abstract, ahistorical conception of human nature 
common to many rationalists, such as Bentham (Marx [1867] 1976, p. 571; [1932] 
1976, p. 36). The 1844 manuscripts insist on the social and historical embeddedness 
of all "real" examples of humankind. Marx thus appreciated the rootedness of action 
which I shall stress, but in his specific arguments concerning the revolutionary poten- 
tial of the working class he focused on an account of rational interests which even 
his own sociological observations (e.g., [1850] 1973, [1852] 1973) suggest is inadequate. 
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of different concrete historical actors with their idiosyncrasies do not con- 
cern him. In the long run, people are rational and outcomes definite. In 
the short run, therefore, people must be in error; Marx, like "scientific 
Marxists" after him, introduces the notion of "false consciousness" as the 
complement to that of "true interests." At the same time, Marx's easy 
move from interests to action is based on a neglect of problems of collective 
action. In the passage just quoted, he hypostatizes the entity "proletariat"; 
elsewhere he offers rather more of an argument for treating the class as 
a unified actor. At no point, however, does he develop a satisfactory 
account of how the class of proletarians becomes the subjective actor the 
proletariat. In short, he asserts but does not demonstrate the transition 
from "class in itself" to "class for itself" ([1847] 1976, p. 211).3 
Marx, together with Engels, argued that the concentration of workers 
in factories and large towns and the increasing organization of the work- 
place itself would help to mold the workers together and provide the 
social basis for their activity (Marx [1847] 1976, p. 211; [1867] 1976, 
chap. 14; Engels [1880] 1978, sec. 2). The leveling effect of industrial 
capitalism would give all workers the same poor standard of living and 
the same desperate wants (Marx and Engels [18481 1976; Marx [1867] 
1976, chaps. 23, 32). Through their everyday interactions based on their 
common interests, and especially through their continuous political activity 
in opposition to their exploiters, the workers would develop a class con- 
sciousness (Marx [1850] 1973, [1852] 1973). It was this class conscious- 
ness that would provide accurate understanding of external circumstances 
and therefore rational reasons for unification in revolutionary collective 
action. 
Marx is thus not without a sociological argument as to the sources of 
proletarian solidarity. It is an inadequate argument, though, as both logical 
and empirical counterarguments suggest. Logically, Mancur Olson (1965, 
pp. 2, 51, 134) has shown that some structure of selective inducements 
is necessary to make it rational for an individual to participate in collective 
action even when the collective good sought is in his interest. This is 
particularly so the larger and more "latent" the group and the more 
costly and widely dispersed the good sought. The reason is that individuals 
may choose to expend their limited resources in the pursuit of other, per- 
haps lesser, goods in ventures the success of which they can better control. 
At the same time, they may try to be "free riders," allowing others to 
pursue a good from which they will benefit but toward which they do not 
contribute (Olson 1965, pp. 105-10). Marx, neglecting such considerations, 
assumes that the very large class of workers will unite to seek a very un- 
3 I suggest we should take Marx's terms to refer to a distinction between a passive 
sum of individual existences and an active single collective existence, much like Rous- 
seau's distinction of the will of all from the general will. 
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certain collective good in a highly risky mobilization, without much control 
over each other. To improve Marx's argument we need a sociological source 
for selective inducements to collective action. Olsen suggests that we may 
find this in social pressure within certain kinds of preexisting organiza- 
tions. I concur, and the present paper expands upon this argument.4 
Empirically, Marx's argument runs up against the relatively low rate 
of participation of members of the modern proletariat in revolutionary 
mobilization and the relatively high rate of such participation among 
artisans and other preindustrial workers. Whereas Marx is emphatic in 
holding that proletarian unity arises out of new conditions of social 
existence, I suggest that preexisting communal bonds are at issue. Further, 
the new proletariat, generally speaking, has had less of this preexisting 
social organization on which to draw than have groups of workers chal- 
lenged by industrialization. This helps to explain why craftsmen and 
peasants, rather than factory workers, form the majority of the revolu- 
tionary crowds of early 19th-century Europe. From the point of view of 
objective interests, Marx finds the proletariat to be bound by "universal 
chains" ([1927] 1975, p. 186). Radical mobilizations, in fact, have come 
more often from very particular chains. 
In the famous last pages of The Poverty of Philosophy ([1847] 1976, 
pp. 209-12), Marx sums up his argument. He indicates that the rise of 
capitalist domination created the class of workers as a mass of individuals. 
"Large-scale industry concentrated in one place a crowd of people unknown 
to one another" ([1847] 1976, p. 210). Under such circumstances, the 
competition created among the workers by capitalists "divides the inter- 
ests" of members of this class (more precisely, Marx should have said 
that similar interests within the competitive job market divide the 
workers). Despite advice from all quarters to the contrary, the workers 
act, not on the interests which divide them, but increasingly on those 
they share. Implicitly, Marx holds that they do so because the shared 
interests are greater. Shared interests (such as maintaining high wages) 
lead the workers to form combinations against their employers; such 
combinations grow in direct proportion to the growth of industry. By 
uniting to compete against the capitalists, workers are able to secure a 
collective good apparently more valuable to each than the private goods 
to be secured by some through competition with others. The initial basis 
4 Others (e.g., Moe 1980) have stressed preexisting organization even more. Olson 
(1965, p. 63) argues that large "organizations that use selective social incentives to 
mobilize a latent group interested in a collective good must be federations of smaller 
groups" (emphasis added). I have developed this idea elsewhere (Calhoun 1980b); 
here I would argue that while a class is nearly always a large, latent group, communi- 
ties within it may provide strong social incentives to mobilization and therefore mem- 
bers of a class may best be mobilized through such intermediate associations as pre- 
existing communities. 
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of this combination, thus, is "a common situation, common [i.e., shared, 
not just similar] interests" ([1847] 1976, p. 211). This is why it is so 
important that workers are drawn from rural isolation into urban con- 
centration. The working class enters increasingly into struggle with the 
capitalists (who already constitute a class for itself) and takes on an 
existence of its own. As a class for itself, "the interests it defends become 
class interests" ([1847] 1976, p. 211); simultaneously, it becomes apolitical 
actor, because "political power is precisely the official expression of antag- 
onism in civil society" ([1847] 1976, p. 212). The unclear point in the 
argument is the nature of the social relations which turn the class in itself 
into the class for itself, which make the proletariat the class of associated 
producers, not simply the aggregated producers. 
In the following pages I shall present an argument that preexisting 
communal relations and attachments to tradition are essential to revolu- 
tionary mobilizations. By the last phrase I mean radical movements which, 
whether they intend to transform society, to topple a government, or to 
extract a few concessions, pose such fundamental challenges to existing 
social trends that those in power can make them no meaningful concessions. 
Obviously revolutionary outcomes have a great deal to do with other 
structural factors, notably the circumstances of state power, as Skocpol 
(1979) has recently observed. Nonetheless, revolutions are not simply 
spontaneous collapses of state power; states are pushed, even when they 
seem to topple like houses of cards. Movements resisting industrial capi- 
talism may more readily give such a push than movements of workers 
within industrial capitalism. This is obscured by Marx's stress on the 
radical novelty of revolution. 
REACTIONARY RADICALS 
There is no principle, no precedent, no regulations (except as to mere 
matter of detail), favourable to freedom, which is not to be found in the 
Laws of England or in the example of our Ancestors. Therefore, I say 
we may ask for, and we want nothing new. We have great constitutional 
laws and principles, to which we are immovably attached. We want great 
alteration, but we want nothing new. [Political Register, November 2, 
1816] 
William Cobbett, author of the appeal to tradition just quoted, was 
the most important publicist and one of the most important popular 
leaders of the rising tide of protest and insurgency which marked the 
first decades of the 19th century in England. His words are salutary for 
those who would understand radical popular mobilizations, including those 
which have produced revolutions, in other times and places as well. Cobbett 
voiced a critique of the existing social and political structure in the name 
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of traditional rights and values. He fought against economic trends which 
were disrupting established ways of life, not in favor of an abstractly 
conceived future. The content of his arguments was distinctively English; 
yet, in form and in their more general orientation, Cobbett's claims for 
tradition have much in common with the ideologies characteristic of most 
popular struggles against emergent or imposed capitalism. These struggles 
have been at once radical and reactionary; their radicalism has been based 
in tradition and in immediate social relations supporting and supported 
by such tradition. 
It is with an unwarranted rationalism that Marxist (and some other) 
analysts have attempted to assimilate these movements to the category of 
class. Engels, indeed, did this when he analyzed the 15th- and 16th-century 
German peasant wars as primitive revolutionary mobilizations based on 
poorly understood class interests ([1850] 1978). Some modern writers 
would go further and argue that the analytic framework of class strug- 
gle can be applied to such precapitalist movements without having to 
use qualifiers like "primitive." Others, though, are more cautious and 
suggest that such mobilizations are neither revolutionary nor class based in 
the sense in which Marx used those terms to describe modern movements. 
For example, in summarizing his argument concerning "primitive 
rebels," Hobsbawm observes that "the political allegiance and character 
of such movements is often undetermined, ambiguous or even ostensibly 
'conservative.' " Their participants are generally "pre-political people who 
have not yet found, or only begun to find a specific language in which 
to express their aspirations about the world. Though their movements 
are thus in many respects blind and groping, by the standards of modern 
ones, they are neither unimportant nor marginal" (1959, p. 2). 
What Hobsbawm means by prepolitical has been fairly clear through- 
out his work: it refers to the ideologically uncertain and ephemeral, 
rather than the analytically sound and historically transformative among 
orientations to collective action. In contrast, it is organized, self-conscious 
action which makes a collectivity's struggle to achieve control over its 
own fate political. "The poor," Hobsbawm has written recently, "or 
indeed any subaltern group, become a subject rather than an object of 
history only through formalized collectivities, however structured. Every- 
body always has families, social relations, attitudes toward sexuality, 
childhood and death, and all the other things that keep social historians 
usefully employed. But, until the past two centuries, as traditional histori- 
ography shows, 'the poor' could be neglected most of the time by their 
'betters,' and therefore remained largely invisible to them, precisely be- 
cause their active impact on events was occasional, scattered, and im- 
permanent" (1978, p. 48). 
Hobsbawm's work emphasizes the disjuncture between millenarian 
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movements, rebellions, and related events in precapitalist societies and 
the more formally organized and rationally self-conscious activity of the 
modern working class. And yet, in a preface to the third edition of 
Primitive Rebels, he suggests that, if anything, he underestimated the 
revolutionary significance of both organized millennial sects and com- 
munities and relatively unorganized millennial movements (1971, pp. 
xi-xii). I think he is right because, when societies are rapidly changing, 
commitment to tradition can be a radical threat to the distribution of 
social power. And communities in which interpersonal relations are 
densely knit, many-faceted, and organized in harmony with traditional 
values can be potent informal organizations on which to base sustained 
insurgency. 
TRADITIONAL COMMUNITIES 
The idea of contrasting modern society to an earlier age of traditional 
communities has been roundly criticized in recent years. The gemein- 
schaft/gesellschaft opposition, to be sure, was somewhat vague and ill 
defined, and, in Tonnies's ([1887] 1957) version, was sentimental and full 
of personal evaluations which are hard to substantiate empirically. Other 
dichotomous renderings of modern history have fallen on similarly hard 
times, and for good reason: history is more complex. I think, however, 
that our rejection of the contrast which shaped sociology's vision of 
modernity may have become as categorical and simplistic as the original 
contrast itself. What we need is to conceptualize a cluster of variables 
measuring traditionality and community.5 Not only would such variables 
get us away from false dichotomization, they would also allow us to treat 
of variance directly rather than through the often spurious indicator 
of historical dates. We could see that at any one time different social 
groups might be organized more or less traditionally, more or less com- 
munally, without treating them as more or less advanced. This would 
avoid the romanticism of the gemeinschaft notion. To challenge the 
relevance of this concept of traditional community would require more 
than evidence that people are selfish or hostile to each other even in 
tribes and small villages. 
We shall need to see tradition as more than a collection of ideas or 
artifacts transmitted from generation to generation. Shils (1981, p. 12) 
has emphasized the basic etymological sense of tradition (traditum) as 
anything "handed down from past to present," but in his book he dis- 
cusses tradition in a variety of senses which go far beyond this usage. I 
suggest that, in order to make full sense of tradition, we shall have to 
5 By convention, let "traditionality" indicate a pattern of social organization rather 
than the ideological value suggested by "traditionalism." 
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see the acts of transmission as all social interaction, with the validity of 
traditional ideas or practices coming not just from their antiquity but from 
the element of consensus and universality of their use. I shall focus on 
traditionality as a mode of organizing social action rather than on tradi- 
tionalism as an abstract ideology venerating the past. This language is 
Weberian, and I have in mind the Weberian notion of social action as 
subjectively meaningful behavior taking account of the behavior of others 
and thereby oriented in its course (Weber [1922] 1968, p. 4), but not the 
Weberian notion of tradition. Weber saw traditional action as "determined 
by ingrained habituation" ([1922] 1968, p. 25) and thought it lay very 
close to the borderline of what could be called meaningfully oriented 
action. Like most thinkers since the Enlightenment, he opposed traditional- 
ism as mere unconscious reflex or unexamined inheritance to rationality as 
conscious and sensible action. Traditionalism was, for Weber, "piety for 
what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" ([1925] 1948, 
p. 296). Such a conceptualization ties tradition too closely to history. I 
suggest that we see tradition less in terms of antiquity and communication 
across generations than in terms of practical, everyday social activity. The 
traditional construction of social reality takes place as people in manifold 
interactions produce and reproduce shared understandings of their be- 
havior. As Shils (1981, pp. 166-67) has put it: 
A society to exist at all must be incessantly reenacted, its communications 
must repeatedly be resaid. The reenactments and the resayings are guided 
by what the individual members remember about what they themselves 
said and did before, what they perceive and remember of what other per- 
sons expect and require of them; they are guided too by what they re- 
member is expected or required of them, what they remember to be claims 
which they are entitled to exercise by virtue of particular qualifications 
such as skill, title, appointment, ownership which are engrained in their 
own memory traces, recorded in writing and in the correspondingly re- 
corded qualifications of others. These particular qualifications change and 
the responses to the changes are guided by recollections of the rightful 
claims and rights of the possessors of those qualifications. 
This is all true, but we need to complement Shils's stress on memory with 
more focus on practical activity, taking place amid specific material needs 
and social circumstances. It can involve habits, to be sure, but socially 
conditioned habits. Tradition is the tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958) which 
allows participation in social life. As such it is hardly rigid. On the con- 
trary, tradition must often be interpreted and reshaped to fit the exigencies 
of contemporary situations (as anthropologists have frequently noted: 
Yalman [1973], p. 139; Colson [1974], p. 76; Bourdieu [1972], chap. 2). 
Strategic reinterpretations of "that which has always been" (Weber [1922] 
1968, p. 36) are common. They are not, however, evidence for either 
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the insignificance of tradition or the universal predominance of self-inter- 
ested individualism. 
The continual reproduction of tradition necessarily involves many minor 
and some major revisions of it. These are signs that tradition remains 
vital and has not become a mere crust of ceremonial lore. But such 
reinterpretations are not the products of discrete individuals acting quite 
self-consciously; they are instead collective interpretations produced or 
acquiesced in by people who take such social constructs as materially real. 
Drawing on, but modifying, Durkheim (esp. [1915] 1965; see also Evens, 
in press), I suggest not that society is an ontological entity, a phenomenon 
sui generis in some absolute sense, but that societies vary in the extent 
to which their members must take them as "naturally" given. Traditional 
societies are those in which they must do so. 
That people should take their social contexts to be as immutably "real" 
as their physical contexts is the result of the special power which those 
social contexts have over them. Closely knit into webs of communal 
relationships, individuals are committed to the long-term view of their 
activity which is implied by the notion of moral responsibility (Bloch 
1973). Choices are still to be made, but they must take social relation- 
ships very closely into account. Tradition is the medium in which inter- 
actions take place. Like language, it is at once passed from individual to 
individual through use and given much of its substantive meaning by 
the particular instances of its use. Changes in social or natural context 
often require improvisations on the part of actors. But these improvisa- 
tions, too, are constructed according to the rules of tradition; they take 
their meaning from their relationships to the rest of the active tradition 
as well as from practical circumstances, and they are validated by com- 
munal acceptance.6 
Traditions do not reflect the past so much as they reflect present-day 
social life. Only to the extent that such social life is coherent and con- 
sistent across the membership of a given society or subsociety can tradi- 
tion be very effective in ordering people's actions.7 Moreover, it is the 
6 See Bourdieu's (1972, pp. 78-87) discussion of the "habitus," the source of regu- 
lated cultural improvisation. Compare also social psychological arguments that indi- 
viduals act to preserve the consistency of their thoughts, feelings, and behavior (Fes- 
tinger 1962, 1964; Heider 1958). In terms of Heise's (1979) distinction of fundamental 
and transient elements of individuals' "control systems," I suggest that (perhaps bar- 
ring psychopathology) most "fundamentals" are products of traditional culture. 
7Thus, although Shils points out that 19th-century liberals were right "to see tradi- 
tions as limitations on human freedom," we might accurately see a "chicken and egg" 
situation. On the one hand, "tradition hems an individual in; it sets the condition of 
his actions; it determines his resources; it even determines what he himself is" (Shils 
1981, p. 197). On the other hand, changing practical circumstances demand innova- 
tion within tradition, some social organizations support stable traditions better than 
others, and individuals vary in the novelty and disruptiveness of their interpretations 
of tradition. 
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repeated practical use of traditions in relating to important others that 
gives the traditions their deep psychological importance. Community 
is thus a central medium for transmitting tradition and a large part of 
what tradition is about. 
Such a view clearly implies a special definition of community. Essen- 
tially, I take community to be the high-end value of a complex variable 
measuring the extent to which people are knit together as social actors. 
To speak of "a community" is thus only shorthand for referring to a 
population characterized by a considerable extent of community. Vari- 
ations in kind or extent of community are established by differences in 
(1) kinds of relationships among people, (2) characteristics of networks 
of those relationships, and (3) extent of autonomous social control. In 
brief, relationships may be stronger or weaker, networks may be knit more 
or less densely and systematically together, and a population may be 
more or less able to run its own affairs without outside intervention 
(Calhoun 1980a). Community constrains the range of free choice of 
individuals by committing them to specific, long-term social relationships. 
Such commitments make it possible for members of communities to act 
with considerable certainty as to what their fellows will do. Relatedly, 
because their activity is kept largely within the grounds of established 
relationships, members of communities are able constantly to reproduce a 
traditional culture without introducing wide variation in interpretation. 
Traditional communities, thus, are closely knit, largely autonomous 
collectivities which share a vital common culture. 
Traditional communities are important bases of radical mobilization. 
Community constitutes the preexisting organization capable of securing 
the participation of individuals in collective action. Communities provide 
a social organizational foundation for mobilization, as networks of kin- 
ship, friendship, shared crafts, or recreations offer lines of communication 
and allegiance. People who live in well-integrated communities do not 
need elaborate formal organization in order to mount a protest. They 
know, moreover, whom to trust and whom not to. Communal relations 
are themselves important resources to be "mobilized" for any insurgency 
(though they are frequently neglected by"resource mobilization"analyses). 
This is part of the reason why peasant, craft, and other popular revolts 
are generally much stronger at the local level than at the national. Indeed, 
such movements generally fall apart or else are taken over by special 
interest groups when they extend much beyond the range of direct, person- 
to-person communal ties. When speaking, for example, of rebellious peas- 
ants in revolutionary France (in either the First or Second Republic), we 
may describe a class similar in external characteristics, but we would do 
well to avoid the conclusion that peasants acted as a class. They acted 
on the basis of numerous local communities, with consequent variations in 
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local strategies, demands, and strengths (see Agulhon 1970, pp. 305-406; 
Price 1972, esp. p. 121). They may have been a class in itself but they 
were only communities for themselves.8 
Traditional communities give people the "interests" for which they will 
risk their lives-families, friends, customary crafts, and ways of life. 
Popular revolts take place either when (1) external pressures on a still- 
coherent way of life are threatening to destroy it or (2) new opportunities 
appear to put old goals within reach. Thus tradition is not in itself 
insurrectionary. On the contrary, it is a conservative force. Much the 
same can be said for community. In ordinary times, the deep-rootedness 
of traditional understandings and communal relationships makes them con- 
servative and provides for the reproduction of culture and social relations. 
But in times of rapid change, this very conservatism may make traditional 
communities politically radical, even revolutionary.9 In reaction to the 
incursions of capitalist industry, for example, handloom weavers and other 
craftsmen in England and France attempted to defend their traditional 
crafts and communities against disruption. It did not matter that hand- 
loom weaving, especially in England, had drawn thousands of new practi- 
tioners during the early years of industrialization, degrading the craft. 
Industrialization continually expanded or created handcrafts at bottlenecks 
in the production process, only to destroy them later (Samuel 1977). 
While these handworkers were relatively weak, compared with many 
better-paid and better-organized artisanal groups, their weakness does not 
alter the centrality of the fact that they frequently lived, worked, and 
revolted in traditional communities (see Calhoun 1982, pp. 43-48, 78-83, 
195-98). As I have argued, it is not antiquity which defines such a mode 
of social and cultural organization. Weavers were thus like more privileged 
artisans in that they fought to defend what they already had. As Sewell 
(1980) has shown, the language of artisans' defense included new ideas 
among the traditional elements as it developed from the Old Regime to 
1848. Traditional corporatism remained, however, a central organizing 
theme. New, more recognizably socialist ideas either developed out of 
corporatism or were incorporated to the extent that they could be fitted 
into the traditional structure of thought and action. Much of the change 
was not in the traditions themselves but in their context. What had been 
conservative in the 18th century became radical with the introduction of 
8 This understanding of the peasantry is implicit in Marx's ([1852] 1973, p. 239) de- 
scription of peasants as resembling potatoes in a sack. Marx grasped the importance 
of social foundations for collective action (e.g., [1847] 1976, p. 211) even though he 
failed accurately to identify the implications of different social foundations. 
9 Moore (1978) describes in detail the role of traditional communities in producing 
tolerance for injustice and also suggests the importance of conservatism in popular 
mobilization during the German revolution of 1848 (chap. 5, esp. pp. 126-33, 158). 
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new technologies and patterns of capitalist economic organization. And it 
was largely these new patterns of capitalism which turned some workers 
from the defense of the rights of particular groups against other workers 
to an increasing focus on the similar situation of all who labor. 
Not all who labored were equally interested in this radical reaction to 
capitalism. Some workers were directly benefiting. Accordingly, in the 
revolution of 1848 in France, employees of factories and modern capitalist 
establishments were relatively uninvolved (Price 1972; Tilly and Lees 
1975; Traugott 1980). Younger workers, excluded from the artisan corpo- 
rations, were often among the first to enlist in the garde mobile, in which 
they played a leading role in the repression of the workers' rising of 
June 1848 (Zeldin 1979, p. 125; see also Agulhon 1970; Merriman 1978; 
Forstenzer 1981). 
Peasants were also somewhat different in orientation from urban artisans. 
On the one hand, most famously, it was peasants who gave the Bonapartist 
regime its strongest popular backing. Conservative in outlook, they backed 
the party of order and authority. But even the Bonapartist regime was 
still, initially, a version of republicanism; peasants were not hostile to 
all change. On the contrary, when the February revolution demonstrated 
the weakness of government repression, peasants immediately acted to 
seek redress for traditional grievances and to realize traditional goals. 
As Zeldin puts it: "In the first days after the revolution, they were 
aware only that the government had gone. Their first reactions were not 
political. They invaded the commons and forests, claiming back the tradi- 
tional rights they had lost to the rich: they sacked the houses of those 
who resisted them; they drove tax collectors and policemen into hiding; 
they refused to pay taxes and tolls" (1979, p. 127). Zeldin goes on to 
describe this collective action of peasants as similar to that which took 
place in towns, "where textile handloom weavers destroyed machines which 
were threatening their livelihoods and where carriage drivers and boatmen 
burnt railway stations and tore up the track of the new invention that 
was ruining them" (1979, p. 127). 
But there was some important difference between the peasants and the 
urban workers, as well as much similarity. The peasants were not just 
Luddites, acting defensively. New taxes and mortgages were on their 
minds; they were the bearers of ancient grudges; yet they acted also with 
ancient ambitions. They sought the material benefits of access to more 
land and the social benefits of independence within their communities and 
especially from outsiders. They sought a new realization of traditional 
values. They were thus open to new political ideas which fitted with their 
existing culture and communities, and the Red Republicans made im- 
pressive gains among the peasants. Though the latter are more famous 
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for voting for Louis Napoleon in 1848, a large number turned to Ledru- 
Rollin and the socialists in 1849.10 
There is no contradiction between the two sorts of radicalism I have 
argued to be based on traditional communities. It is important to recognize 
both the defense of traditional practices and the demand for the practical 
implementation of traditional goals long unrealized. Noting the latter 
helps to explain the disproportionate radical involvement Wolf (1969, 
p. 292) finds in the 20th century among relatively prosperous "middle" 
peasants. Such peasants get involved in potentially revolutionary struggles, 
not because they have completely new ideas about how the world should 
be run, but because they have old ideas about how their own lives should 
be run.1" Peasants, like both urban and rural craftsmen, are a potent 
radical force because (a) they have the resources with which to engage 
in struggle; (b) they have a sense that, during periods of upheaval and 
weakness of the state apparatus, goals for which their ancestors had 
struggled for centuries are all but within their reach; and (c) they have 
much more to lose if they do not succeed in controlling their own destinies 
than do those already poverty-stricken or forced out of traditional com- 
munities and into the less solidary populations of early industrial wage 
laborers. 
Traditional communities, I have suggested, give their members the social 
strength with which to wage protracted battles, the "selective induce- 
ments" with which to ensure full collective participation, and a sense of 
what to fight for that is at once shared and radical. This sets traditional 
communities apart from the modern working class. The solidarity of such 
traditional communities may also give their members a better ability to 
recognize collective enemies. The very closed nature of such communities, 
their resistance to outsiders, may appear "backward" to us and yet be 
part of the basis of their occasional reactionary radicalism. Communal 
organization provides for a considerable degree of self-regulation. Where 
small localities and specialized crafts are involved-as in most of Old 
Regime Europe and much of the Third World today-the boundaries of a 
community are fairly clear, and inside them social relationships are largely 
autonomous and self-regulating. Borrowing White's (unpublished) notion 
of a "CATNET," Tilly (1978, pp. 62-64) has suggested the importance 
of being both categorically distinct from outsiders and strongly knit to- 
10 Margadant (1979) has shown that the politics of peasant communities varied by 
region, with the Southwest accounting for most of the peasant involvement in the 
1851 insurrection. 
11 Perhaps the most important description of these ideas is the notion of a "moral 
economy" which Thompson (esp. 1971) has brought into prominence. See also Scott 
(1976) for an application of the concept to recent Asian peasant movements. The long 
tradition of taxation populaire reveals similar concerns in France. 
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gether internally in a social network. Such groups, he argues, find mobiliza- 
tion easier. 
In four important ways this is characteristic of traditional communities 
and helps to explain their ability to mobilize directly, instead of through 
the formal organizations so important to the modern working class. First, 
the members of such a community will find it relatively easy to identify 
collective enemies. If, as happened during the processes of industrializa- 
tion and central state formation in much of the world, elites choose to cut 
themselves off from local communities, they become outsiders and poten- 
tially set apart as enemies. Conversely, the integration of elites into local 
communities decreases the likelihood of action against those elites. Second, 
a largely self-regulating system may be upset by any sort of intrusion. 
Thus, even well-intentioned efforts to improve the lives of the poor can 
threaten the communal lives of artisans, peasants, and others. If permitted 
to continue, such efforts displace communal autonomy by offering a new 
source of resources. Quite often, however, communities rebel against all 
disruption, including that of "do-gooders." Third, to the extent that a 
community is self-regulating, it has good reason to visualize a society in 
which it and other communities like it are entirely autonomous and free 
from elite interference and exploitation. Thus, traditional artisanal and 
peasant control of the labor process is matched by communal control over 
social life-in contrast to the experience of members of the modern work- 
ing class, who are subjected to the constant intervention of formally 
trained "experts" in both work and personal life (cf. Palm 1977; Lasch 
1981). Fourth, the autonomy of communities gives them a strong founda- 
tion for mobilization outside the purview of the intended targets of collec- 
tive action, a free "social space." The need to work through formal, 
noncommunal organizations means that modern workers' movements must 
always be exposed to ideological counterattacks. 
RADICALISM OR REFORMISM? A QUESTION OF SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS 
The fact that the working class of advanced capitalist countries has tended 
to pursue reforms of many kinds but not to organize "spontaneously" for 
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism has long been noted.'2 This phe- 
12 The debates over "revisionism," "left deviationism," "opportunism," and the like 
in the turn-of-the-century Second International provide the locus classicus for this ob- 
servation. Bernstein ([1899] 1961, p. 221) held that the conditions in which workers 
lived precluded an immediate demand for socialism and necessitated reformism. Lenin 
([1902] 1975, p. 24; [1920] 1975, p. 609) agreed that workers could not spontaneously 
go beyond reformist "trade union consciousness" but insisted that a vanguard party 
could introduce class consciousness itself. Luxemburg ([1906], esp. pp. 15-16, 63) denied 
the proposition that the workers could not directly produce revolution; immediate 
mass collective action would, she thought, school the workers in revolutionary class 
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nomenon, of course, contradicts one of Marx's expectations. The real ques- 
tion, though, is how one is theoretically to accommodate the evidence. 
The fact that revolution has not yet occurred in a major industrial country 
does not, of course, prove that it will not occur; as a rebuttal to Marxism 
the postponement of the revolution lacks theoretical force, however prac- 
tically relevant it may be. What one wants to know are the causal factors 
which need to be discarded from Marx's theory as invalid, or those which 
must be added as intervening or basic variables. This paper has so far 
considered the previously neglected importance of tradition and community 
in providing for radical movements. I wish now only to suggest a few 
social characteristics of the modern working class which are thrown into 
relief by contrast to reactionary radicals of various kinds. In particular, 
problems have arisen from a confusion of revolutionary zeal, revolutionary 
interests, and revolutionary capacity. 
Enthusiasm for revolution has been much more widespread among intel- 
lectuals and other groups generally cut off from the main body of 
workers than it has been among the working class. In revolutions that 
have occurred, such groups have been crucial-especially as the agents 
of state building and central organization after the destruction of old- 
regime authority. Such intellectuals have seldom been the prime movers 
in creating the revolutionary movements, even when they have given them 
their major ideological orientations. A central question raised by this 
observation is whether revolutionary intentions are good predictors of 
revolutionary activity. This issue has two components. First, many revolu- 
tionary ideas are incorporated into the ideology of groups that do not 
seek revolution-indeed, many authoritarian states claim to be revolution- 
ary. Second, key actors in revolutionary insurrections have often sought 
simple redress of wrongs or reforms; it has been the objective inability of 
elites to mitigate their grievances that has led to both increasing radical- 
ization of the insurgents and the revolutionary impact of their claims. 
More generally, it needs to be questioned whether the intention to engage 
in revolution or even to be particularly radical is necessary to producing a 
radical mobilization. Traditionalist, anticapitalist claims may be presented 
in the most moderate and reformist manner and still confront elites with 
demands to which they can make no meaningful concessions. 
In dealing with the moderation of demands by workers in advanced 
capitalism and with the preponderance of precapitalist classes in actual 
revolutions, Marxists have introduced various arguments. Lenin stressed 
consciousness even without the interventions of a vanguard party. Anarchists were, 
at the same time, arguing that revolution need not depend on the workers at all; they 
have a modern-day echo in some "Third World Marxisms." Populist pessimists like 
Piven and Cloward (1978) also reject the reformist workers in favor of "the poor," 
though they, are not so sanguine about the prospects for revolutionary transformation. 
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the limits of spontaneous working-class consciousness and action and the 
need for intellectual leadership from outside to go beyond mere trade 
unionism (1902, p. 24). More recently, an important body of literature 
has addressed problems in the definition of the potentially revolutionary 
proletariat. Such writers on class structure have been concerned (a) to 
indicate those workers and members of the petty bourgeoisie whose inter- 
ests may be contradictory within modern capitalism and (b) to show the 
potential importance to proletarian struggles of workers (e.g., in sales and 
clerical occupations) who do not, strictly speaking, produce surplus value 
(see, e.g., Mallet 1963; Gorz 1967; Poulantzas 1974; Wright 1978). A 
central assumption in this line of analysis is that workers (like others) 
respond rationally to their objective interests. Class interests are emphatical- 
ly distinguished from the empirical concerns of particular members of the 
proletariat or even the whole proletariat (as per Marx [1845] 1975, p. 
37). Though this approach has been effective in showing the complexity of 
the modern capitalist class structure and the applicability of Marxist cate- 
gories in studying it, to draw revolutionary political conclusions from this 
analysis implies a combination of wishful thinking and willful resistance 
to empirical evidence. Its proponents have taken a very rationalistic posi- 
tion which ignores both the concrete ideological orientations of real workers 
and the organizational difficulties of collective action. 
Faced with the failure of workers to seek their "objectively" defined 
interests, these writers have been obliged to fall back on the notion of 
false consciousness. In such an argument, both the conditions of immediate 
existence and the active ideological efforts of elites are held to impede 
recognition of true class interests. "Class interests in capitalist society 
are those potential objectives which become actual objectives of struggle 
in the absence of the mystifications and distortions of capitalist relations. 
Class interests, therefore, are in a sense hypotheses: they are hypotheses 
about the objectives of struggle which would occur if the actors in the 
struggle had a scientifically correct understanding of their situations" 
(Wright 1978, p. 89). 
The notion of true as opposed to false class interests is problematic 
in itself.13 Most often noticed is the arbitrariness by which external analysis 
of objective interests is granted priority over the subjective awareness 
actors have of their own interests.14 "Marxists who have employed the 
13 It is fashionable among non-Leninist Marxists to use Gramsci's notion of hegemony 
rather than that of false consciousness to explain the diversion of workers' attention 
from "ultimately rational" ends. In this context the difference is fairly slight. 
14 Defense of such "empiricist" concerns as what real members of the working class 
may think or have thought has been central to Marxist social history in opposition 
to at least the structuralist variant of Marxist theory. It is an important part of the 
basis for Thompson's (1979) polemic against Althusser. Thompson's willingness to con- 
sider the concerns of real workers has led him to recognize some of the reformist 
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notion of class interest have encountered great difficulty in giving it a 
precise empirical meaning. . . . In a theory of rational action, 'interest' 
may be assigned an exact meaning as part of a definite game, applying 
to a number of clearly demarcated social situations, on the market and 
elsewhere. But when used in more complex contexts to denote 'long-term', 
'objective' or 'true' interests-that is to say, something other than factual 
preferences-the notion seems to provide a spurious objectivity to essen- 
tially ideological evaluations" (Therborn 1978, p. 146). The notion of 
interests employed by Wright in his equation of revolutionary class con- 
sciousness and recognition of true interests is based on extremely rigorous 
and unrealistic assumptions. In particular, he assumes that there are no 
conflicts among true interests for members of the proletariat, though he 
recognizes that some people are in contradictory class positions (1978, 
pp. 61-87). Moreover, counter to the theory of collective action (e.g., 
Olson 1965; Moe 1980), he assumes that rational recognition of interests 
directly implies the rationality of action in pursuit of those interests. 
When Marx proposed that revolution was the only rational course of 
proletarian action, he was simultaneously maintaining that workers had 
nothing to lose but their chains. In other words, revolution was rational 
in Marx's account because there were no more moderate, less risky ways 
for workers to improve their situations. This condition must be maintained 
for the rationality of revolution to be successfully argued. It is not enough 
to hold that a socialist society which could only be achieved through 
revolution would be better than the capitalist society which will remain 
in the absence of revolution. Such quantitative difference in possible benefits 
cannot outweigh the qualitative difference in costs and risks. In order to 
argue the case for a rationalist theory of interests as the basis for revolu- 
tionary action, one must maintain in some fashion either that no alterna- 
tives are available to members of the potentially revolutionary class or 
that the available alternatives are irrelevant. In this connection Marx 
described in some detail the conditions he thought would so polarize 
capitalist society and immiserate workers that they would have no reason- 
able alternative. Confronting the same issue, Wright simply maintains 
that class interests cannot be reduced to individual interests (1978, pp. 
implications of the existence of numerous competing interests and the "imbrication of 
working-class organizations in the status quo": "We need not necessarily agree with 
Wright Mills [1963, p. 256] that this indicates that the working class can be a revolu- 
tionary class only in its formative years; but we must, I think, recognize that once 
a certain climactic moment is passed, the opportunity for a certain kind of revolution- 
ary movement passes irrevocably-not so much because of "exhaustion" but because 
more limited, reformist pressures, from secure organizational bases, bring evident re- 
turns" (1965, p. 281). Though I agree with Thompson's argument about modern poli- 
tics, I argue here in contrast to Thompson (1963) that this is due to a profound dis- 
continuity in workers' history. See also Calhoun (1982). 
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87-90; Levine and Wright 1980, pp. 56-58), thus holding that the 
existence of alternatives for individuals is irrelevant. False consciousness 
becomes largely the primacy of individual consciousness over class con- 
sciousness, but it is hard to see how Wright can escape hypostatizing 
the class. 
If one refuses to grant the absolute irreducibility of class interests, 
their existence quite separate from any interests or expressed preferences 
of the individuals composing the class, then one must confront Olson's 
proposed problems in the logic of collective action. Olson presumes both 
complete rationality and perfect information, so mystification is not his 
explanation for failure to act collectively. On the contrary, he suggests that 
"unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in 
their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests" (1965, p. 2). The reason for this 
finding, surprising when first offered, was simple. Olson held that indi- 
viduals were not totally subsumed into collectivities but had numerous 
interests, sharing only a few. The rational course of action was to pursue 
individual interests whether or not they were shared, because in the 
absence of coercion one could not depend on one's fellows, and in large 
groups, without a high rate of participation, one's share in the proceeds 
of action would not be matched by the costs of one's own contributions. 
Moe (1980) has recently suggested that Olson's theory underestimates 
the importance of direct political inducements; in other words, people are 
more interested in political values relative to economic values than Olson 
had thought. But Moe's analysis does not remove the problem of getting 
from individual interests to collective action; instead, it introduces a 
broader treatment of individual interests, one which better fits the goals 
of interest group politics. Marxist analyses based on rational recognition 
of objective interests offer no substantial argument for the radical prece- 
dence of class over individual interests which they assert. This is as true 
of historicist versions (e.g., Luk'acs [1924] 1971) as it is of scientistic 
versions (e.g., Wright 1978). 
I suggest that the problems posed by Olson can be met in large part 
by my analysis of traditional communities. Not only does the sharing of 
tradition predispose individuals to similar analyses of their situations, 
but embeddedness in communal relations also produces an interdependence 
of interests among individuals. In a village of handloom weavers, for 
example, most of the handful of nonweavers-greengrocer, publican, shop- 
keeper-were likely to be as dependent on weaving for their prosperity 
as were the weavers themselves. A network of debts may be as important 
as one of sentiments; between the two it seems quite understandable that 
each should identify his interests with all. 
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There are certainly limits to the role which this kind of social organiza- 
tion can play in producing bases for collective action. Larger groups 
not only obscure the contributions (or lack thereof) from particular in- 
dividuals and spread the proceeds of action over a larger pool of benefi- 
ciaries, they also make it less likely that communal relations of great 
density will be formed. Perhaps it is also the case that the more complex 
the strategy needed to realize a set of shared interests, the less likely 
a mobilization based on traditional communities will be to succeed. None- 
theless, traditional communities offer definite advantages. To cite only 
one area, both Olson and Moe find that the decision to join an interest 
group in the first place requires explanation within their theories. But 
both, especially Moe, are concerned primarily with formal organizations, 
self-consciously created and joined by their members. Traditional com- 
munities preexist any particular mobilization over any particular set of 
interests. Instead of incurring a cost by creating an organization, members 
of traditional communities are presented with a major resource in the 
shape of precisely that social organization and shared set of values they 
are seeking to protect. 
Traditional communities thus provide for the existence of shared inter- 
ests and the capacity to act on them. It remains to suggest two reasons 
why they should be radical and why "modern" workers should not be. 
The first reason is that the sorts of goals sought by reactionary radicals 
are fundamentally incompatible with such existing trends as the rise of 
industrial capitalism. They are radical not in themselves, in the abstract, 
but, rather, in relation to what goals other people are pursuing and what 
concessions governments or privileged groups are prepared to make. Thus 
the radicals of late 18th-century Europe sought what Thompson (1971) 
calls "the moral economy," the right to sell their products rather than 
their labor (Reddy 1979), a "just price" in markets, especially for food 
(Tilly 1975), the right to raise their own children and support their 
wives, to labor at home or in small workshops instead of in factories, 
to continue producing by hand and with craft skills rather than be replaced 
by machines or forced to produce "cut-rate" goods, to petition their 
"betters" for redress of wrongs, to use common lands for grazing or gather- 
ing firewood, to be paid in specie instead of paper money. 
This was hardly a Marxist rationalist's list of class interests, and indeed 
there were several more rationalistic contemporary partisans of the work- 
ing class or the common people who despaired of popular traditionalism. 
John Wade complained, for example, "One thing is certain, that these 
ancient laws have been a real stumbling block in the way of the Reformers; 
they have been the subject of endless unmeaning altercation; they have 
filled the heads of the people with nonsense, and covered their advocates 
with contempt and ridicule. That our leaders should continue to stick 
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to these follies, is both provoking and astonishing. Can they bring nothing 
to bear against the old rotten borough-mongering system but the musty 
parchment, black letter and Latin quotations?" (The Gorgon, June 20, 
1818, p. 35). 
Despite this traditionalism, despite an ideology which seldom got beyond 
a vague populism, the demands of the members of traditional communities 
were indeed radical. Handloom weavers could not be granted their con- 
tinued peaceful existence without stopping the advance of technological 
innovation and capital accumulation. When Parisian artisans resisted the 
division of labor, they were attacking the industrial revolution itself. 
Capitalist industrialization did not mean just a lower standard' of living 
for these workers, it meant the eradication of the communities in which 
and the traditions by which they lived and worked. In other words, it 
meant the destruction of these people as collectivities. There was little 
that capitalism could offer in return. No ameliorative reforms, no welfare 
system would speak to the fundamental complaints of these insurgents. 
Such concessions would have been nice (and the rich and powerful did 
precious little to soften the hard lot of the poor), but they would have 
left untouched the radical incompatibility of the economic and social 
basis of the populists' lives-traditional crafts and communities-with the 
new order. 
So, however mild and peaceable their intentions, the reactionary radicals 
presented a very serious challenge to public order and nascent capitalism. 
Already in the early 19th century their cousins in modern industrial 
work could organize unions and pursue their interests without posing 
such a challenge. They were born of capitalism and could compete within 
it for various distributive gains without fundamentally threatening the 
new order. 
The second way in which the members of traditional communities were 
radical, which also sets them apart from the modern workers, lies in their 
capacity for action. The workers of early 19th-century France and England 
were defeated, of course.15 But they had more in common with those 
who in other times and places have participated in successful revolutions 
(whether or not they have liked the resulting states) than do the workers 
of modern capitalism. Skocpol (1979, pp. 148-49) has noted the existence 
of stronger and more autonomous communities in France and Russia as 
key reasons for the more rapid progress of their agrarian revolutions than 
China's. She and Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975) have rightly stressed 
both the importance of weaknesses in state power to revolutionary success 
and the long-term trend of strengthening state apparatuses. This increas- 
ing power, with its improved capacity for government reDression of revolu- 
15 The stories are told well by Thompson (1963) and Prothero (1979) for England 
(though see also Calhoun [1982]), and by Price (1972) and Sewell (1980) for France. 
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tion, certainly helps to explain the predominance of reformist movements 
in recent Western history. But another finding of Tilly et al. suggests a 
change in the strength of the mobilizations themselves. They found that 
violent protests became larger and more "proactive" between 1830 and 
1930 as urban proletarians replaced artisanal and rural communities as 
the protagonists. But these protests also became shorter, less sustained 
and concerted efforts. I suggest that the change in social foundations 
from traditional communities to formal organizations of individual workers 
is the reason.16 When traditional communities were mobilized, they were 
able to stay mobilized over long periods of time in the face of considerable 
privations. Like the "true believers" found at the core of millenarian 
movements by Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956), the reactionary 
radicals were integrated into a social organization which kept their beliefs 
and ambitions alive. As already noted, they did not have to pay high 
costs for maintaining a special purpose organization. They also had few 
other directions in which to turn for improvement of circumstances.'7 
Where communities do not already link potential insurgents to each 
other, formal organization becomes more important. This in itself exerts 
a pressure against truly radical popular actions. Strictly maintained formal 
organization may be central to Leninist theory and practice, but it is 
precisely a substitute for mass revolutionary mobilization (though it 
arguably never succeeds without the latter). As Piven and Cloward (1978) 
among others have noted, the existence of formal organizations often 
contributes to a sense that someone else is carrying the burden of protest, 
and one need not sacrifice one's own resources. Formal organizations, 
moreover, are prone to the problems of oligarchical control, noted early 
on by Michels (1949). The larger the organization (or population to be 
organized), the more acute this problem becomes (Mayhew and Levinger 
1976). Such oligarchy both gives the leaders of the organizations an 
interest in preserving the organization itself rather than serving the needs 
of their constituents and cuts the leadership off from the larger popula- 
tion, minimizing the likelihood of widespread participation. Even for those 
outside an organization's elite, investment in the organization gives mem- 
bers an interest in preserving it rather than risking it in revolutionary 
action.'8 
16 This argument is consonant with Tilly et al. (1975) though it is not posed in their 
analysis; Tilly does suggest something similar (1979, p. 38). 
17Migration, especially to the United States, was probably the main alternative; it 
was immense among the generation of 1848 in continental Europe; see Whitridge 
(1949, pp. 238-326). 
18Thompson (1965, p. 281) has commented on "the truly astronomic sum of human 
capital which has been invested in the strategy of piece-meal reform." Hirschman 
(1970) offers the leading general attempt to describe the options open to members of 
organizations who have made such commitments. 
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Finally, the need to work through formal organizations creates the 
possibility for competition among organizations. To be sure, communal 
ties can also create competition among subgroups, and examples abound of 
residential communities split in contests between kin groupings and single 
crafts rent by struggles between competing organizations (e.g., the various 
trade corporations of Old Regime France; see Sewell [1980]). Such cases 
do not, however, produce quite the same likelihood of fractious "splitting" 
among ideologically defined groups as formalization can produce. And 
18th-century compagnonnages were in any case formal organizations over- 
lapping with informal craft communities. Their very formal structure was 
part of the reason for their decline, as it remained rigid in the face of 
socioeconomic change and gave masters insupportable, largely hereditary 
privileges at the expense of the growing numbers of journeymen. It was, 
for the most part, the traditions of mutuality and the value of labor, and 
the crafts-based communities, which carried forward into the nascent 
socialism of the Second Republic, not the formal organization. 
Though organization building is not antithetical to radical action, and 
indeed is necessary to securing enduring gains, formal organizations do 
militate against the sorts of radical movements that have provided most 
frequently the initial revolutionary destruction of old regimes. Workers 
in the major capitalist nations of the West lack the sociocultural founda- 
tions for radicalism which traditional communities gave the artisans of 
the early 19th century. This is not to say that modern workers are con- 
servative; on the contrary, it is to suggest that they are not so conservative 
as to be forced into radical opposition to social change. They may be 
extremely left-wing, but a reformist strategy will nearly always be rational 
for them. 
Although a number of social scientists have stressed that working-class 
community has not completely dissolved into mass society, even their 
work shows some important differences in the nature and extent of com- 
munity. Kornblum (1974), for example, shows blue-collar workers focus- 
ing a great deal of attention on community politics and working through 
primary groups and local unions. His study of South Chicago shows a 
cluster of diverse ethnic enclaves but finds processes through which com- 
peting groups are also establishing some integration at the level of "com- 
munity." Yet they are doing so largely through formal organizations, 
including many over which they have far less than complete control, 
and some-such as the Democratic party machine-the specific aim of 
which is to secure a share of resources disbursed elsewhere. The steel 
mills in which they work are owned by distant corporations; collective 
action to confront such employers requires organization far beyond the 
level of face-to-face relationships. The degree of craft control such workers 
have over their jobs is generally slight, and the extent of political self- 
909 
American Journal of Sociology 
regulation they can achieve is limited by their greater integration into 
the larger society and indeed the international economy. 
This is not to deny the existence of community; I would even suggest 
that urban ethnic groups should be at least as important as rural villages in 
our images of community. But even though primary ties still exist and 
are important to individuals, in many places they are no longer able to 
organize much of public life. The communities of early industrial Europe 
were in transition; they are thus not the extreme of traditionality-per- 
haps tribal kinship-governed societies are. But the traditional communities 
of early 19th-century France and England and of Russia in 1917 and 
China in 1949-were different from South Chicago. They were smaller, 
more densely knit, more autonomous, more able to produce and reproduce 
the cultural medium of their social solidarity through their everyday 
interactions. They learned of their common past and developed their 
dreams for the future, not in schools or from television, but in families 
and from each other. 
Centralization and individualism-Tocqueville's ([1844] 1961) twins- 
the greater scale and lesser organization of much of everyday life in modern 
capitalist societies, make formal organizations necessary. Acting through 
such organizations makes reformism more likely. The working class as 
it now exists lacks the unifying social basis for collective action which 
community structure provided (and in some cases continues to provide) 
to those who would resist the extension of capitalist relations of production 
and social forms. The necessity of acting through formal organizations 
both produces problems of motivation and militates against extremely 
radical-especially democratic-actions. Perhaps most important, the 
modern working class is potentially able to secure ameliorative reforms 
within capitalist society. This does not alter any interests workers might 
have in socialism, or even in a socialist revolution, but it implies that 
revolutionary or other radical action is not necessary, but only one option. 
One does not even have to hold that it is easier for the state to repress 
insurgency, though it undoubtedly is; or that it is easier for capitalism's 
opponents to split the ranks of workers or mystify them with ideology, 
though that may be true as well. Even if these things were not true, 
the sociocultural foundations on which modern workers act do not make 
really radical mobilization as rational or as effective as traditional com- 
munities made it for artisans and peasants during the transition to capi- 
talism. 
CONCLUSION 
Marx thought that revolution would be no risk, but rather the result of 
desperation, when workers had nothing to lose but their chains. I have 
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argued that, on the contrary, revolutionary and other radical mobiliza- 
tions take place when people who do have something to defend, and do 
have some social strength, confront social transformations which threaten 
to take all that from them and thus leave them nothing to lose. I have held 
that traditional communities are the crucial source of such radical mobili- 
zations. I have not maintained that traditional communities are always 
radical or even remarkably forward looking in ideology. On the contrary, 
under most conditions they are bulwarks of the existing order, the social 
foundations of deference and quiescence. During times when the existing 
order seems deeply threatened, including especially such great periods 
of transition as the industrial revolution, such communities may find that 
they can be traditional only by being radical. Whether their radical 
mobilizations lead to revolutions depends on much else-on the strength 
of the states which they confront, for example, and on whether or not 
educated elites and formal organizations stand ready to turn insurrection 
into real social transformation and new state power. Reactionary radicals 
have seldom, if ever, been able to gain supremacy in revolutions. But 
at the same time, revolutions worthy of the name have never been made 
without them. 
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